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June 12, 1986, Conference 
List 1, Sheet 2 
No. 85-1581-CMY (, 
RICHARD SOLORIO (protests ex-




Cert to Ct.Mil.App. 
(Everett,~
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr contends that Ct.Mil.App. has expand---
ed the court-martial subject matter jurisdiction beyond the lim-
its of O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 u.s. 258 (1969), and Redford v. 
Commandant, 401 u.s. 355 (1971), and that retroactive application 
of this new expansion violates his rights to due process. 
C-t.Mil.~. hoA ~QW\W ~~ Ot\ ··~ ~· 
~ ""' ~~" ~ bow:.~ 0"' ~ Q-·~ \W~A·~· 
~. Co.WJ.. 
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2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Petr was living in Ju-
neau, Alaska, while serving in the Coast Guard. After an unre-
lated transfer to Governors Island in New York, petr was charged 
with fourteen specifications in connection with acts with two 
minor children of Coast Guard parents while in Juneau. The chil-
dren were neighbors and friends of petr' s children. The acts 
r OCCUrred Within petrI S privately OWned horne in JuneaU 11 mileS 
~om the Federal Office Building where he worked. (There is~ 
base or enclave in Juneau for Coast Guard personnel.) Petr also 
~ , -----------~~-------~~rv' faced seven similar, but unrelated specifications for acts in New 
~ York. . ..... 
~~~ After hearing evidence and argument, the trial judge 
·~ dismissed the fourteen Juneau specifications under Relford v. 
Commandant. Th~ge -f~~ ~ 
"-- [Petr] was properly absent from his unit at the 
time of each [offense in Juneau] . 
"--Each offense • • • occurred away from any rnili tary 




occurred in a place not under 
"-- [T) here was no connection between the accused's 
military duties and the alleged offenses. 
"--The victims were not service members and were not 
involved in military duties or military supported or 
sponsored activities at the time of any of the alleged 
offenses. 
"--Civilian courts are present [in Alaska] and avail-
able to adjudicate the offenses. While the State of 
Alaska has presently deferred prosecution in light of 
this proceeding, the State has not waived prosecution, 
nor declined to prosecute. 
"--Accused was not in uniform and in no way flouted 
military authority at the time of the alleged offenses. 
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"--None of the alleged offenses posed a threat to any 
military installation . . . [or] resulted in any viola-
tion of military property. 
"--All the alleged offenses are of the type tradi-
tionally prosecuted by civilian courts and are specifi-
cally of the type the Coast Guard has recently consent-
ed to have civilian courts prosecute Coast Guard mem-
bers for in Alaska. 
" There has been no demonstrated impact of the 
offenses on morale, discipline, the reputation or the 
integrity of the Coast Guard in Juneau .••• The impact 
apparent in this case, that is, on the parents and the 
victims themselves is not different than that which 
would be produced by a civilian perpetrator. 
" ... There has been no showing of diminished morale, 
discipline, or effectiveness within the military commu-
nity in Juneau, Alaska. As to the effect of the al-
leged incidents toward the Coast Guard within the ci-
vilian community, there has been speculation by mili-
tary persr but little more •.•. " 
The Court of Military Review concluded that the trial 
judge had erred in basing his assessment of the impact on the 
Juneau command solely on the observed effect after departure of 
all parties, and that the relevant inquiry would be the impact of 
the offenses on morale and discipline at Governors Island, where 
the accused is now stationed and living on base. The court also 
disagreed with the trial court's finding that the parents were no 
more affected than if the perpetrator had been a civilian: "Such 
a conclusion overlooked the possible unique and distinct effect 
from the discovery by the fathers that a fellow Coast Guardsman 
may have committed volati ve offense" and the "natural expecta-
tion" that the Coast Guard "would take appropriate action to vin-
dicate the outrage felt from such a grievous breach of faith by 
one shipmate towards another." The court held that there was 
"service connection" and therefore jurisdiction as a matter of 
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law. The dissent argued that a remand for further factual find-
ings (~, effect at Governors Island) was necessary. 
The Ct.Mil.App. found that the Ct.Mil.Rev. had probably 
intruded upon the military judge's factf ind ing power, and that 
precedents involving offbase sex offenses against civilian de-
pendents of military personnel "would point to a different con-
elusion" than a finding of jurisdiction, Petition Sa, but never-
theless affirmed. 
Relying on "later developments in the
11
military community 
"' and in the society at large," and on "an increase in the concern 
of victims of crimes," Ct.Mil.App. decided to expand jurisdiction 
to include the present offenses. The court noted that the girls 
were receiving counseling after the offense, and that the parents 
also suffered psychological and f inane ial harm ("except to the 
extent that, as military dependents, the victims were entitled to 
medical car/'t government expense"). 
ve'f .Mil.App. noted that petr had been transferred from 
Juneau before the discovery of the offenses, but opined that "if 
this [transfer] had not occur red, it obviously would have been 
difficult--if not impossible--for the victim's fathers to contin-
ue to serve in the District Office with him." Id., at lla. The 
court also speculated that future assignments for petr "would be 
greatly limited" because of the animus felt towards sex offend-
ers. Finally, the court speculated that there might be lessened 
interest of civilian authorities in prosecution due to the mili-
tary transfers of the victims and the accused away from Alaska, 
and benefits to petr, the victims, and the Coast Guard from try-
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ing the Juneau offenses together with similar offenses allegedly 
committed at Governor's Island. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appellate defense divisions from the 
~vy-Marine Corps, the~my, ana t~e~;ast Guard have subm~ ttea ·--------separate filings in support of granting the petition. Because of --- \;;;; - ~ ,.-,._.~ ........ ,.-., ~ 
the substantial similarity of the basic claims, the various argu-
ments are treated in this memo as "petr's" contentions. 
Petr first argues the Ct.Mil.App. has departed from 
O'Callahan and Relford. The Court in O'Callahan recognized that 
military jurisdiction deprives citizens of the fundamental pro-
tections of the. Bill of Rights and Article III, ana must be lim-
ited "to the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." 
395 U.S., at 265, quoting Toth v. Quarles, 350 u.s. 11, 23 
(1955). O'Callahan held that the service status of the offender 
was necessary but not sufficient for court-martial jurisdiction. 
395 u.s., at 267. There must also be a showing that the offense 
ll .. , 
is service-connected. Ia., at 272. Petr contends that under the 
~ .._, ~
factors applied in O'Callahan, i.e., petr's proper absence from 
the base, the commission of the offense off base, the c i vi 1 ian 
status of the victim, the absence of military control over the 
location of the offenses, ana the availability of civilian courts 
to prosecute, ia., at 273, there is no military jurisdiction. 
Petr alleges that the present case similarly fails under 
the traditional application of the factors outlined in 
O'Callahan's successor, Relford v. Commandant, 401 u.s. 355 
(1971). In Relford, the Court. applied the service-connection 
test to a corporal who committed, on base, offenses against ci-
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vilian females who were related to servicemen. Petr argues that 
in finding juri sd ict ion, Ct. Mi 1. App. ignored the detailed find-
ings of fact by the trial judge, who made specific inquiries into 
the Relford factors. 
Petr contends that beyond this rewriting of the record, 
Ct.Mil.App. has erred more significantly by relying on the "con-
tinuing effect" of the offenses on the victims and the military 
as its basis for jurisdiction. Basing jurisdiction on the psy-
chological effect on the victim and the attendant impact on the 
military, petr argues, would justify courts martial hearing cases 
on many crimes, including any violent crime against a service 
dependent. Moreover, the military is affected whenever a 
servicemember commits an offense, if only because the military is 
deprived of his services while he is prosecuted and serving sen-
tence, and because it casts the military in a bad light when the 
defendant is a serviceman. This expansive reach of court-martial 
jurisdiction is incompatible with the detailed inquiries of 
Relford and O'Callahan, and the cases' reluctance to confer ju-
risdiction except to the least possible measure adequate to the 
end to be served. 
Petr also argues that Ct.Mil.App. has erred in suggest-
ing that developments in the military and society since 
O'Callahan and Relford justify re-examining the cases applying 
that law. Society's increased concern for the victims of crime 
is no reason to deprive a serviceman of the constitutional pro-
tections of a civilian trial when jurisdiction is otherwise want-
ing. Moreover, there is no indication that the civilian justice 
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system is any less interested in or any less capable of protect-
ing the rights of victims than the military justice system. Cer-
tainly here the Coast Guard has been completely satisfied with 
the treatment of similar cases by Alaskan courts. As the 
Ct.Mil.App. pointed out, Congress and state legislatures have 
made changes in civilian criminal systems to protect more fully 
the rights of victims. 21 M.J. 251, 254-155. Alaska has stated 
only that it will defer prosecution. 
Petr also contends that this case is not a rogue deci-
sion. The Ct.Mil.App. has steadily increased the jurisdiction of 
courts-martial. Until 1980, the military courts found a lack of 
jurisdiction in a significant number of military cases involving 
off-post offenses including the use, sale, and transfer of drugs, 
sex violations, and property crimes. See Army Brief 7. In 1980, 
however, a divided Ct.Mil.App., in United States v. Trottier, 9 
M.J. 337, 350, held that "almost every involvement of service 
personnel with the commerce in drugs is 1 service connected. 1 " 
Three years later, the court held it had jurisdiction over off-
post larcenies committed with a stolen military ID card, even 
though the result was not consistent with its precedents. United 
States v. Lockwood, 15 M.J. 1, 10. Recently, the court held that 
it had military jurisdiction in any offense committed by service-
men overseas. United States v. Holman, 19 M.J. 784 (A.C.M.R. 
1984), aff 1 d, 21 M.J. 149 (C.M.A. 1985). In the present case, 
Ct.Mil.App. has gone beyond even these cases and found military 
jurisdiction based on the "concern for victims of crimes." 21 
M.J., at 254. 
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Petr also argues that retroactive application of the new 
jursidiction, even if the jurisdiction is warranted, denies him 
Due Process. As Ct.Mil.App. admitted, its precedents "point the 
other way." Petr therefore had, at the time of the offense, an 
expectation that he was guaranteed indictment by grand jury and 
trial by petit jury. 
Resp SG first contends that the case is on interlocutory 
appeal. Although petr subsequently has been convicted and sen-
tenced, the sentence has not been upheld by "the convening au-
thority." The SG also contends that the trial on the merits has 
produced additional facts that are relevant to the issue of ju-
risdiction. The SG acknowledges that if Ct.Mil.App. declines to 
hear this second appeal, the Court cannot grant certiorari (cer-
tiorari not available to courts of military review), but contends 
that the Ct.Mil.App. is "sensitive" to this fact, and that col-
lateral attack in federal habeas is still available. 
On the merits, the SG uses a rationale mentioned by the 
Court of Military Review but not relied upon by Ct.Mil.App.: 
there is no military base in Alaska for Coast Guard personnel and 
their families. A result contrary to Ct.Mil.App.'s would unrea-
sonably restrict the ability of the Juneau commander to protect 
military personnel and their dependents. It is "immaterial" in 
the "unusual circumstances" of this case that the child abuse 
occurred in petr's horne. 
The SG also argues that Ct.Mil.App. was correct in rely-
ing on the effect on service families. Enlisted personnel must 
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feel secure about the safety of their families in order to carry 
out their missions while away from home. 
Finally, the SG notes that the Alaska child abuse 
charges did not stand alone, but petr was also charged with com-
mitting similar offenses against other military dependents at 
Governors Island. The charges thus presented a pattern of behav-
ior that posed a real threat to families near petr. 
4. DISCUSSION: On the ~e of retroactivity, it ap-
pears that the decision, although part of a trend within 
Ct.Mil.App. towards more expansive court-martial jurisdiction, 
was not foreseeable. The primary area of expansion involved il-
legal drugs. See Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74 (C.M.A. 1983); 
United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980). When the 
offenses occurred, petr still was guaranteed indictment by grand 
jury and trial by petit jury of peers. 
Petr is correct in arguing 
~ 
that the case erodes 
O'Callahan and Relford by finding court-martial jurisdiction 
based on a "new development" based on "concern for victims of 
crime." Ct.Mil.App. had found service connection based upon the 
"continuing effect on the victims and their families 'which ulti-
mately impacts' on the morale of any military unit." Petition 
lOa, 12a. It is difficult to see how the limits of such an ap-
proach fit w~ the boundaries drawn by this Court. 
The SG's counter arguments are not convincing. The SG ~ ..... ____ _ 
attempts to characterize this case as unique, noting the fact 
that there is no military base in Alaska, but the Ct.Mil.App.'s 
opinion does not rely on any unusual facts. It is true that 
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Relford adopted "an ad hoc approach to cases where a trial by 
court-martial is challenged." 401 u.s., at 365-366. But despite 
1-<d rl-
the SG's attempts the opinion from Ct.Mil.App. simply doe~ bear 
out the characterization of this case as one that is squarely 
bottomed on unusual facts. As the language in the preceding 
paragraph shows, the Ct.Mil.App's opinion is not confined by any 
particularly abnormal circumstances. In fact, Ct.Mil.App's con-
cerns about "continuing effect" would justify court-martial ju-
risdiction after ~ violent crime had been committed by a ser-
viceman upon service dependents, even though that result is 
clearly beyond the contemplation of this Court in Relford and 
O'Callahan. 
Nor do I find the SG's "discipline and effectiveness" 
-----..-. 
arguments convincing. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 u.s. ---------738 (1975) (court must gauge "the . impact of an offense on mili-
tary discipline and effectiveness, ... whether the military in-
terest in deterring the offense is distinct from and greater than 
that of civilian society, and ... whether the distinct military 
interest can be vindicated adequately in civilian courts"). Set-
ting aside Ct.Mil.App. 's strained counter-factual argument here 
("had [Solorio's transfer prior to the discovery of the offenses] 
not occurred, it obviously would have been difficult .•. for the 
victims' fathers to continue to serve in the District Office with 
him"), the court's rationale here again reaches far beyond 
Relford and O'Callahan. It proves too much to say that officers 
and enlisted personnel "must feel secure about the safety of 
their families in order to carry out their responsibilities while 
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away from horne." This reasoning would extend court-martial ju-
risdiction to breaking and entering an off-base horne by another 
serviceman. 
Despite the arguments of the SG and the Ct.Mil.App, it 
does not seem relevant that there were other, similar charges 
pending (where court martial jurisdiction was presumably proper). 
Nothing in Relford or O'Callahan remotely suggests that the pres-
ence of jurisdiction over some charges confers jurisdiction over 
"similar" charges arising from actions at a different time and 
place. The two cases seem to point the other way, with their 
emphasis on assuring that, as far as possible, servicemen retain 
their constitutional right to grand-jury indictment and trial by 
petit jury. Court-martial precedent also provides little or no 
support for this "super pendent jurisdiction." 
v. Shockly, 18 C.M.A. 610 (1969) ·, dismissing 
See United States 
off-post charges 
even though similar service-connected charges existed. 
Finally, although the case is interlocutory, the juris-
dictional issue is not subject to further challenge in the mili-
tary courts, or to alteration by those courts. If Ct.Mil.App. 
declines to exercise discretionary review on petr's appeal from 
his subsequent, recent conviction, this Court cannot hear the 
case. Therefore it appears that this is a case where "intermedi-
ate" review is proper because the question of jurisdiction has 
been finally decided, and later review of the jurisdictional 
issue may be frustrated despite the ultimate outcome of the case. 
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 u.s. 469, 481 (1975). 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend granting the etition 
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on the jurisdictional question and on the accompanying 
retroactivity question. 
The SG has filed a response. 
June 6, 1986 Chinnis Opinion in petition 
June 12, 1986 
Court ................... . v·oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 85-1581 








Burger, Ch. J ................. /; 
Brennan, J .................... I/ 
White, J ............. . ........... j 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "/ 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Powell, J .................... . \1 . . . . . . . 
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . / ~ 
Stevens, J ..................... j ' .IY.. 




N POST DIS AFF HEY AFF G D 
ABSEN'l' NOT YOTING 
February 4, 1987 
SOLORIO GINA-POW 
85-1581 Solorio v. United States(U.S. Court of Military 
Appeals) 
MEMO TO FILE: 
This case presents a straightforward question of 
jurisdiction as between military and civil ian court. In 
addition, a due process claim is argued rather weakly. 
Petitioner was a petty off ice r in the Coast Guard 
serving in Juneau, Alaska. There was no military "base" 
or "enclave", and Coast Guard personnel live and work in 
the city and reside in the civilian community. Petitioner 
was charged with sexua~ abusing the 10-year old daughter 
of his next door neighbor, -- Johnson, a Coast Guard 
enlisted man. Petitioner also had a young daughter, and 
the two girls often played together. The alleged offense 
by petitioner occurred in his own residence over a period 
of two years. 
Following petitioner's transfer to Governors Island 
in New York, and after he was charged with similar 
offenses there, petitioner was charged with sexual abuse 
in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
This case involves only Alaska charges. Petitioner 
2. 
alleged that the military court lacked jurisdiction 
because the offenses were not "service connected" under 
this court's decisions in O' CAllahan v. Parker, 395 u.s. 
258 and Relford v. Commandant, 401 u.s. 355. 
The Trial Judge (I assume the Military Judge 
Advocate) granted petitioner's motion to dismiss for want 
of jurisdiction. He concluded that the Alaska offenses 
were not sufficiently "service connected" to be triable in 
a military criminal justice system. On appeal, the Coast 
Guard Court of Military Review reversed, and reinstated - ............ 
the Alaska charges. The Trial Judge had found a number of 
facts with respect to the absence of any connection 
between the offenses and the Coast Guard of Military 
Service. The Court of Military Appeals apparently 
accepted these facts, but concluded that the crimes were 
sufficiently serviced connected to justify prosecution by 
a Court Martial. It found that "sex offenses against 
young children [in the military] have a continuing 
effect on the victims and their families and ultimately on ----.. 
the morale of any military unit or organization to which 
the family member is assigned." The court identified a 
number of factors that it believed relevant to its 
decision. 
3. 
In O'Callahan v. Parker, decided in 1969, this court 
announced / new law in this area by holding that a court 
martial may not exercise jurisdiction over service 
personnel unless, on the facts of the case, the offense 
has a sufficient impact on military interests to be 
service connected. The opinion was written by Douglas, 
and joined by Warren, Black, Brennan and Marshall. Harlan 
wrote a strong and on its face quite persuasive -
dissent, in which Stewart and White joined. Justices Reed 
and Clark had retired, and Justice Fortas had resigned. 
In Relford v. Commandant (1971), this Court 
reaffirmed O' Callahan and narrowed the focus to three 
unrelated inquiries: " ( 1) the impact of an offense on 
military discipline and effectiveness, ••• (2) whether the 
military interest in deterring the offense is distinct 
from and greater than that of civilian society, and ... 
(3) whether the distinct military interests can be 
vindicated adequately in civil courts. See also 
Schlesinger v. Councilman (1975), and more recently our 
opinion in Goldman v. Weinberger that involved the wearing 
by a Jewish serviceman of a yarmulke. 
Although the SG finds, contrary to the findings of 
the TC, that the facts in this case show an adequate 
4. 
"service connection", the SG's primary argument - at least 
as I read the brief is that we should overrule 
O'Callahan and Relford. O'Callahan has been cited a 
number of times since its decision, and I think it 
doubtful that a majority here would be disposed to 
overrule it despite the arguments made by Harlan in his 
quite interesting dissent in which he reviewed English 
history. 
It is true, as Harlan emphasized, that the 
Constitution vests open-end authority on Congress to make 
rules for the "government and regulation" of our military 
forces. This authority prompts Harlan to argue and 
conclude that the jurisdiction conferred on military 
courts by Congress is not limited to "service connected" 
offenses, and that this Court should leave it to Congress 
to determine the jurisdiction of military courts. 
If the issue were presented here for the first time, 
I would find it a close one. Normally, where - as in this 
case - the offense violates state criminal law as well as 
the common law, and is committed off-base, I would think 
the civilian courts are better qualified to try the case 
and apply state law than a military court. In this case, 
however, it is true that petitioner had left Alaska and 
5. 
that the New York courts probably would have had little 
interest in sending him back to Alaska, particularly since 
he had committed similar offenses in New York. It also 
certainly is true that where the offense is committed on 
the child of another service member in this case a 
"friend"), the effect on morale may be adverse. But if 
the military had turned petitioner over to the civilian 
courts promptly, there is no reason to doubt that he would 
have been prosecuted under Alaska law. 
In sum, I would like my clerk - in a brief cert memo 
- to indicate whether there is any basis for overruling 
O' Callahan in light of what the Court subsequently has 
written. Secondly, I would like my clerk's view as to 
· whether O' Callahan properly must be read as controlling. 
If the answer to the first of these questions is "no", and 
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This case involves the juris dictional boundary between ~ 
civilian courts and military courts martial. The questions ~~ · 
presented are: (1) did the court below erroneously conclude -
that petitioner's crimes were •service connected,• and thus 
·~ 
"' '-- ·could be prosecuted in military couft; (2) should the case 
that established the limitations on military jurisdiction, 
0 1 callahan v. Parker, 395 u.s. 258 (1969), be overruled. 
I. BACKG ROO ND 
Petitioner Richard Solorio was a Coast Guard member 
stationed in Juneau, Alaska. There is no military base in 
Juneau, so Solorio and the other 300 Coast Guard personnel 
1 ived in private homes in the civil ian community. Petr 1 s 
children were friendly with the daughters of two other serv-
icemen, and the girls often came to the Solorio house to 
play. It was during these visits that petr sexu~lly molest-
ed the girls, who at the time were between the ages of 10 --------·-
and 12. The abuse took place over a two-year period. 
In June 1984 Solorio was reassigned to the Coast Guard 
base at Governor 1 s Island, New York. (The fathers of the 
victims also were transferred, but not to New York.) There 
petr molested the daughters of two other servicemen. Petr 
finally was arrested, and during the investigation the 
crimes in Alaska came to light · for the first time. The 
Coast Guard commander in New York convened a court martial, 
and petr was charged with 21 specifications including inde-
cent assault and attempted rape. Fourteen of these charges 
related to the Juneau incidents, the remaining seven in-
volved the New York crimes. 
Solorio moved to dismiss the 14 counts alleging of-
fenses in Alaska, arguing that the military court had no 
'---------
jurisdiction to consider these offenses. At the hearing on 
2. 
this motion, the arguments focused on two cases, O'Callahan 
v. Parker, supra, and Relford v. Commandant, 401 u.s. 355 
(1971). In O'callahan, the Court held that not all crimes --committed by a serviceman could be tried by a court martial. 
Instead, said the Oourt, the crime must somehow be "service 
connected" before the accused could be denied the greater 
protections afforded to civilian defendants. Two years lat-
er in ~lford, the Court attempted to define the concept of 
"service connected" more precisely, identifying 12 critical 
factors and 9 addi tiona! considerations that courts should 
address in deciding whether military jurisdiction was prop-
er. See 401 u.s., at 365, 367-369 (a list of the factors 
and considerations Cl to this memo) • 
'-._....- The military trial judge granted Solorio's motion to 
dismiss, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to 
show a connection between the Coast Guard's interest in 
prosecution and the Alaska offenses. The judge made a se-
ries of factual findings that were tied to the Relford fac-
tors. The were: ( i) the crimes 
took place away from a military base and while Solorio was 
off-duty; (ii) the Alaska civilian courts were available to 
prosecute the offense; (iii) the crimes did not have any 
impact on "morale, discipline, the reputation or the integ-
rity of the Coast Guard in Juneau, the personnel assigned 
there, [or] on military operations or missions"; (iv) there 
was little evidence that the allegations concerning Solorio 
were know to the civilian community in Juneau, or that the 
3. 
Coast Guard's relations with the community had suffered; (v) 
although the crimes had affected the work performance of the 
victims' fathers, the impact on the Coast Guard itself was 
negligible. See J.A. 195-200; Petn 62a-63a. 
The Coast Guard Court of Military Review reversed and 
---------:-.::::::::-~""C~· ·~- ·--------
reinstated the charges, finding that the trial judget s anal-
ysis was flawed in several respects. For example, the court 
held that it was error to look only at the effect of the 
offenses on the military and civilian community in Juneau. 
It also was necessary to look at the impact of the charges 
on the Coast Guard personnel in New York, since this was 
where petr currently was based. The court also rejected the 
trial judge's finding that the Alaska state court system was 
~ available to try the case. The court held that in compari-
son to the military, the civilian courts had a lower incen-
tive to prosecute petr because both he and the victims had 
moved from the state. See Petn 32a-34a. 
~ 
The Military Review Court then reevaluated the evi-
dence, and concluded that the crimes were service connected. ,........____ 
The court examined the Relford considerations and found that 
Solorio's crimes had interfered with the Coast Guard's com-
mander' s responsibility to maintain order and discipline 
over those in his command. See Relford, 401 u.s., at 367 
(consideration (b)). The court also emphasized that the 
victims were the dependents of servicemen, and that petr had 




Solorio appealed, but the u.s. Court of Military Ap-
peals (USCMA) affirmed. The court acknowledged that "our 
precedents involving offbase sex offenses against civilian 
dependents of military personnel would point to a different 
conclusion." Petn Sa (citations omitted). It indicated, 
however, that more recent cases concerning the service con-
nection doctrine required a reexamination of that precedent 
'-- - - --...._...____ ~ 
"in light of more recent conditions and experience." Id., 
at 9a. 
The USCMA gave little indication what these recent con-
di tions were, except to note that society was becoming in-
creasingly concerned with the rights of victims. The court 
then went on to find that these sex offenses had a continu-
ing adverse affect on both the victims' families and on the 
military unit to which they are assigned. The USCMA noted 
that the victims' fathers had become less effective on the 
job, and that the need for family counseling placed an emo-
tional and financial strain on the servicemen. The court 
also found that it would be more efficient to try all 
charges in New York before a court martial (where juris dic-
tion on the New York crimes was conceded), rather than try 
some in New York and the rest in Alaska. 
Solorio was court martialed in New York in February 
1986. He was convicted on 8 of the 14 counts arising from 
the Alaska incidents, and 4 of the 7 New York charges. 
s . 
II. DISCUSSION 
Petr claims that the decision below has expanded court-
martial jurisdiction beyond the limits allowed by this 
Court's precedent. The SG makes two argmnents in response. 
First, he claims that the USCMA holding is in fact consist-
ent with O'callahan and Relford. Second, if this Court de-
termines that the crimes were not service connected, the SG 
asks that O'callahan be overruled. 
A. Is the Decision Below Consistent with Precedent? 
Solorio persuasively argues that the lower courts have 
misconstrued the "service connected" requirement of 
O'callahan. He points out that the trial judge examined 
nearly all of the factors and considerations set forth in 
\....._../ Relford, and found as a matter of fact that none of these 
criteria for military jurisdiction had been satisfied. Petr 
argues that the appeals courts largely ignored this analy-
sis, choosing instead to adopt a more flexible approach that 
largely eviscerates this Court's decisions. He also asserts 
that this case is part of a conscious trend in recent USCMA 
cases to increase the military's jurisdiction. 
The SG does not deny that the USCMA failed to follow 
this Court's precedents precisely. He nevertheless claims 
that the decision below is correct, because the USCMA gave 
great weight to several facts that demonstrate an overwhelm-
ing military interest in prosecuting the offense. First, 
the SG points out the victims were the dependent daughters 
of Coast Guard p.ersonnel. The evidence showed that when the 
6. 
-
victims' fathers learned of the crimes their job performance 
was adversely affected, and they became more suspicious of 
their coworkers. These problems made the fathers less use-
ful to the military, and thus Coast Guard had a direct in-
terest in ensuring that Solorio was prosecuted. An attack 
on a serviceman's dependents also affects the rest of the 
military unit. Crimes such as child abuse could cause the 
victim's father to seek revenge against the perpetrator, 
thus threatening the morale and discipline that is essential 
in any military setting. Consequently, the SG argues that 
crimes against military dependents should be considered 
service connected as a matter of law. 
Second, the SG claims that there is a direct relation-
ship between petr's crimes and the Coast Guard's commander's 
interest in running the Alaska installation. The trial 
judge found that the crimes had only an indirect impact on 
the military, in part because the offenses occurred off base 
in a private home. But the commander is responsible for the 
conduct and order of those under his control regardless of 
their location. Indeed, it may be more necessary for the 
commander to have authority over crimes when there is no 
military base, since the Coast Guard's good reputation among 
the civilians depends in part on its willingness to disci-
pline its own members. Thus, it is argued, the mere fact 
that a crime was committed off-base should not be decisive 
in determining whether an event is service connected. 
7. 
There is merit to these claims, but neither is compel-
1 ing. The Relford Court found it "significant" that the 
victims in that case were relatives of servicemen, but ap-
parently did not include this point in the list of factors 
and considerations that affect juris diction. See 401 u.s. 
366-369 (but cf. consideration (f)). Moreover, the depen-
dency status of the victims seems relevant to the Coast 
Guard only to the extent that it affected the fathers' work 
performance. The trial court found that the effect on the 
military was remote, and although the appellate courts dis-
agreed with this conclusion, the factual basis for their 
disagreement is unclear. Thus while there is a relationship 
between a crime against a dependent and the military inter-
est, nothing in the precedent or logic suggests that it is 
entitled to the presumptive weight that the SG suggests. 
The second argument also is not terribly persuasive. 
Despite the SG's claim that the military commander has the 
same interest in the · offense regardless of where it occurs 
both O'callahan and Relford hold that the situs of the crime --------is critical. Even though the commander is generally respon-
~
sible for the conduct of his men, this argument is too broad 
because it would make every crime committed by a serviceman 
subject to court martial. This view was squarely rejected 
in 0' Callahan. Also, there is little evidence that the 
crimes in this particular case had an adverse impact on the 
morale of other servicemen in Juneau, or on the civilian 
community. The trial judge found that no one at the Coast 
8. 
Guard Station even learned of the charges until after petr 
and the victims were transferred. 
The SG's next claim is that the unusual procedural pos-
ture of this case makes it service related. Here Solorio 
also was charged with similar crimes in New York, and it is 
undisputed that he was subject to a court martial there. It 
was more efficient to try all offenses in the same proceed-
ing, thus ensuring that justice was done quickly, so that 
the victims will be spared the ordeal of testifying twice. 
This argument makes sense as a matter of policy, but I 
am not sure that it makes the crimes service connected. It 
always will be more efficient to try a soldier who is 
charged with both a military and a civilian offense in the 
"-..._..-. same court martial, but nothing in the case law suggests 
that administrative convenience is a sufficient basis for 
military jurisdiction. It also is not clear that that it 
woUld have been more efficient to prosecute the charges to-
gether in this case. The New York and Alaska crimes involve 
separate victims and separate evidence, and thus each victim 
would have to testify only once even if the charges were 
prosecuted separately. The victims and their families also 
had to travel to testify no matter where the trial was held. 
So even if the USCMA was correct in considering the effi-
ciency advantage of a court martial, I question the conclu-
sion that it weighed heavily in the government's favor here. 
Finally, the SG argues that the Alaska civilian courts 
had a diminished interest in prosecuting Solorio • . In 
9. 
Relford, the Court noted that one of the considerations sup-
porting court-martial jurisdiction was the inability of ci-
vilian courts to vindicate a distinct military interests. 
401 u.s., at 368. The SG notes that in this case the Alaska 
prosecutor deferred to the military, suggesting that it had 
1 ittle interest in prosecuting a Coast Guardsman who had 
been transferred. The SG points out that if this Court were 
to find that petr was entitled to a civilian trial, there is 
no guarantee that petr would be retried in Alaska, or even 
that the victims would return to that State to testify. 
Since the Coast Guard plainly has an interest in seeing that 
petr is prosecuted, it is argued, the State's reluctance to 
do so favors affirming the decision below. 
~ Again, there is merit to this argument, but not as much 
as the SG suggests. Alaska has not said it will not prose-
cute, it simply has stated that it will defer. Indeed, dur-
ing the New York trial, the parties stipulated as to the 
expected testimony of an Alaska District Attorney, who would 
have stated that "[s]hould the Coast Guard determine, howev-
er, that the court martial is without jurisdiction to prose-
cute this case, [Alaska] would reconsider its decision not 
to prosecute.• J.A. at 67. 
To summarize: the SG makes several arguments as to how 
the Alaska offenses are service related within the meaning 
of o• Callahan. The best argument is that the victims were 
dependents of servicemen, and that t .he crime therefore af-
' fected their father's military performance. In other re-
10. 
spects, however, the SG fails to show how the crimes had a 
bearing on any military interest that would justify extend-
ing juris diction, particularly since there was no direct 
impact on the Coast Guard itself. Because the trial judge 
found that none of the other Relford factors were present, 
it seems that the USCMA erred in finding court martial ju-
risdiction. 
B. Should O'callahan be Overruled? 
The SG claims that O'Callahan marked an abrupt and un-
warranted change from prior law. Before that decision, the 
test for jurisdiction appears to have been the status of the 
' ' defendant: I ~ • serv 1ceman, court if he he could be was a 
- -- ·--------.....__. 
martialed regardless of the offense. See Kinsella v. United 
~ States ex rel. Singleton, 361 u.s. 234, 240-241 (1960); see 
also Gosa v. Mayden, 413 u.s. 665, 672 (1973) (plurality 
opinion) (O'callahan was a "clear break with the past"). 
The SG asserts that this prior test was clearly supported by 
the Constitution; Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 provides 
that Congress has the power to "make regulations for the 
~
Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces." 
See also O'callahan, 395 u.s., at 275 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing). He now argues that the service-connected test should 
be overruled and that court should again defer to Congres-
sional judgment about which offenses are subject to a court 
- -· ----------martial. The SG advances three arguments for his view: re-
cent developments have undermined the O'Callahan rationale; 
11. 
the service-connected test is unworkable; and O'Callahan is 
inconsistent with the deference owed to Congress. 
1. Recent Developments. The Court's primary reason for 
limiting military jurisdiction in O'Callahan was that court 
martials do not adequately protect the rights of the ac-
cused. The Court noted, for example, that the officer who 
convened the Court martial had enormous influence over the 
disposition of the case, because he was allowed to app9int 
__/ 
the presiding officer, the members of the panel, and the 
defense counsel. See 395 u.s., at 264. The presiding offi-
' 
cer was not a neutral party, and often had direct command 
over the court-martial panel. Moreover, the O'Callahan 
Court was troubled by the great disparity between the civil-
ian and military rules of procedure, evidence, and discov-
ery. See, e.g., id., at 264 n. 4 ("in a court martial, the 
access of the defense to compulsory process [depends] on the 
approval of the prosecution"). Finally, this Court conclud-
ed that court martials are "singularly inept in dealing with 
the nice subtleties of constitutional law." Id., at 265. 
The SG asserts that ~ese conditions~ lon~  
because over the last few years the military has altered its 
procedures. The convening off ice r 
over the trial now than in the past, 
tribunal are far more independent. 
has much less influence 
and th~embers of the 
~rial is no longer 
conducted by a presiding officer, but by a military judge 
selected by the Judge Advocate General. The SG claims that 










partiality as his civilian counterparts. In addition, de--
fense counsel is now chosen according to procedures set 
forth by regulation, and in some cases is removed from the --=----=---> . 
convening officer's chain of command. Finally, the Manual 
for Courts Martial expressly prohibits any attempt to influ-
ence or intimidate the members of the court. 
13. 
The SG also claims that th ules of procedu~~ dis- ~ ~ 
covery have changed. The military judge now has sole re--------------sponsibility for controlling the scope of discovery, not the 
prosecutor. The Military Rules of Procedure also have been 
revised to bring them more in line with the federal civilian 
rules. In addition, efendant now is entitled to a pre-
trial investigation that allows him to preview the govern-
\....___.- ment • s case and cross-exam1ne witnesses before trial. Fi-
nally, the SG asserts that the military judges now have 
greater experience in resolving constitutional questions, 
making the difference in protections afforded by the mil i-
tary and civilian courts negligible. See Schlesinger v. 
Councilman, 420 u.s. 738, 758 (1975) (LFP for the Court) 
(assuming that military court system will vindicate service- } 
man's constitutional rights). 
These are appealing arguments, because they suggest ----that there would be little substantive harm in abandoning 
the O'Callahan test. But even if the details have changed, 
-------the underlying rationale for that decision ns: a ser-
viceman still is denied significant rights in a court mar--tial that he would be granted in a civilian trial. Most 
significantly, a serviceman has no right to a grand jury --------
indictment or a trial by jury. The denial of the latter --right is especially troubling, because the court martial 
panel that decides defendant's guilt is not analogous to a 
jury. The convening officer still has great discretion in 
choosing the members, who invariably are of a higher rank 
than the accused. More importantly, there is no requirement 
that the panel reach a unanimous verdict; a 2/3 vote is all 
that is needed, even for non-capital murder. See Brief Ami-
cus Curiae of u.s. Army, Defense App. Div., at 16-17 and 
n.29. 
This is not to suggest that these differences make all 
military trials fundamentally unfair. As the SG points out, 
if a serviceman was tried for a misdemeanor in a State ci-
vilian court, he still would not necessarily be tried before 
a jury. But the basic differences between the military and 
civilian courts that were recognized by O'Callahan still 
strike me as significant. So while I might conclude as an 
original matter that the service-connected test is not con-
stitutionally compelled, I also cannot 
rationale of O'Callahan has been so fully 
now should be overruled. 
conclude that the 
2. An "unworkable" rule. Even though the 0' Callahan 
rationale is basically sound, the Court still would be jus-
tified in overruling that decision if experience had shown 
that the service-connected standard was unworkable or unduly 
burdensome on military courts • . The SG claims that in fact 
14. 
the test has led to great confusion and inconsistent re-
sults. For example, the SG cites a military case decided 
shortly after O'Gallahan was announced, involving a service-
man's use of drugs. At that time the military court decided 
that the crime was sufficiently service-related to sustain 
court-martial jurisdiction; several years later in another 
case, however, the same court held that the off-base use of 
drugs did not meet the 0' Callahan test. The court subse-
quently reversed its position again, so that now virtually 
all drug offenses are subject to court martial. SG Brief at 
42 (citing cases). Moreover, the SG claims that disputes 
over jurisdiction constune a disproportionate amount of re-
sources. During one 2-year period, for example, roughly 12% 
~ of the cases prosecuted by the Air Force involved jurisdic-
tion questions. 
I have no doubt that the O'Callahan test is difficult 
to apply at times. But I do not agree that the SG has shown 
that the service-connected requirement is •unworkable." The 
example involving drug offenses is unpersuasive -- all that 
the SG has shown is that "drug cases" do not always receive 
identical treatment. But 0' Callahan clearly contemplates 
that the existence of jurisdiction will turn on the facts of 
----------~~------~,--------~~----~ 
each case, so it should not be surprising that not all drug 
~ 
cases are tried in the same forum. It would be more indica-
tive of confusion if the SG could show that two cases with 
similar facts were tried in different forums. Moreover, the 
SG has not cited any scholarly literature or USCMA cases 
'·· 
15. 
that have demonstrated how the test is flawed. In short, 
without more evidence of chaos in the lower military courts, 
I am not convinced that O' Callahan has been so burdensome 
that it should be overruled. 
' 
3. Deference to the Military. The SG's final claim is 
that Congress and the military are in a much better position 
-----.....___ ------ _ ________, 
to decide which crimes should be subject to a court martial, 
and thus this Court should remove the limitations on this 
authority imposed by O'callahan. They cite a series of this 
Court's cases in which we have emphasized the importance of 
deferring to military judgment in matters involving the spe-
cial needs of the service. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinber-
ger, 106 s. Ct. 1310 (1986} (the "yarmulke" opinion, in 
which you joined}; Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 u.s. 57, 64-65 
(1981} ("in perhaps no other area has the Court accorded 
Congress greater deference"}; Schlesinger v. Councilman, 
supra. 
This argument is largely true, but it has two flaws. 
First, O'callahan involved a judgment on how best to protect 
the trial rights of servicemen. Whether this decision was 
correct as a matter of constitutional interpretation is not 
~
a question that requires deference to military expertise. 
Second, Congress has not demonstrated a burning desire to 
' 
give the military courts more latitude. In fact, in 1983 
' 
Congress extended this Court's jurisdiction to allow consid-
eration of appeals from the military courts. See 10 u.s.c. 
( Supp. II I} § 867 (h) ( 1} • .This extension seems inconsistent 
16. 
with the notion that the military should have more freedom 
to resolve its own cases. 
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
I am sympathetic to the military's position, because 
intuitively it seems that an attack on a serviceman's child 
is sufficient to support court martial jurisdiction. The 
trial court reasonably applied the service-connected test, 
however, and concluded that the impact on the Coast Guard 
was insignificant. Although USCMA either disregarded or 
reversed some of these findings, its opinion as a whole ap-
pears to expand military jurisdiction beyond the limits es-
tabl ished by this Court. I therefore recommend that the 
decision below. be reversed. 
--~~---
I also recommend that the Court not overrule 
O' Callahan. There have been changes in military law and 
procedure since that case was decided, but there remain im-
portant differences between the rights afforded to defend-
ants in civilian and military trials. Given this, the serv-
ice-connected test is a reasonable method for balancing the 
-----------. ·-·- · ·-· 
needs of the military against the rights of the accused. 
---~~ 
The SG has not presented any compelling reason to think that 





Relford suggested that the following factors should be 
considered in determining whether a military court has 
juris diction: 
1. The serviceman's proper absence from the base. 
2. The crime's commission away from the base. 
3. Its commission at a place not under military control. 
4. Its commission within u.s. territorial limits. 
5. Its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to 
authority stemming from the war power. 
6. The absence of any military connection between the defendant's 
military duty and the crime. 
7. The victim's not being engaged in the performance of any duty 
relating to the military. 
8. The presence and availability of a civilian court in which the 
~ case can be prosecuted. 
9. The absence of any flouting of military authority. 
10. The absence of any threat to a military post. 
11. The absence of any violation of military property. 
12. The offenses being among those traditionally prosecuted in 
civilian courts. 
The Court also ruled that there are 9 other considerations 
that may affect the jurisdiction issue. 
a) The interest of the military in the security of persons and 
property on the military enclave. 
b) The responsibility of the military commander for maintenance 
of order in his command, and his authority to maintain that 
order. 
c) The adverse impact of a crime committed on a military base on 
security, morale, discipline, and reputation of the base, and the 
impact on the personnel and upon the military operation. 
• .
d) Congress' power under Article I, §8, Cl. 14 •to make rules for 
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.• 
e) The possibility that civilian courts will have less interest, 
concern, ahd capacity to vindicate the military interest. 
f) The presence of factors such as geographical and military 
relationships that have important significance in favor of 
service connection. 
g) Historically, whether the crime against a person by one 
associated with the post was subject to the General Article. 
h) Whether the crime is a purely military offense that has no 
counterpart in civilian criminal law. 
i) The inability to draw meaningful lines between the military 
post's military and non-military areas, or between a serviceman's 
duty and off-duty activities. 
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733 Opinion of the Court 
I 
This Court has Ion reco nized that the military is, J { 
by necessity, a s ecialized society se arate from civiliall_ 
society. We have also recognized that the military has, 
again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its own 
during its long history. The differences between the mili-
tary and civilian communities result from the fact that "it 
is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be 
ready to fight wars should the occasion arise." United 
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). In 
In re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147, 153 (1890), the Court ob-
notice of appeal should be treated as a failure to file a timely notice 
of appeal, and that the appeal must accordingly be dismissed. See, 
e. g., Territo v. United States, 358 U. S. 279 (1959); Department of 
Banking v. Pink, 317 U. S. 264, 268 (1942). He also urges that the 
question whether an appeal may be taken to this Court from the 
Court of Appeals under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 presents a question of 
first impression. 
We hold that "any court of the United States," as used in § 1252, 
includes the courts of appeals. The Reviser's Note for § 1252 
states that the "term 'any court of the United States' includes the 
courts of appeals . . . ." The definitional section of Title 28, 28 
U. S. C. § 451, provides: "As used in this title: The term 
'court of the United States' includes the Supreme Court of the 
United States, courts of appeals, district courts . ... " Our reading 
of § 1252 is further supported by that section's legislative history. 
Section 1252 was originally enacted as § 2 of the Act of August 24, 
1937, c. 754, 50 Stat. 751. Section 5 of that same Act defined "any 
court of the United States" to include any "circuit court of appeals." 
We also find no merit in appellee's contention that the asserted defects 
in appellants' notice of appeal deprive this Court of jurisdiction. As 
appellants note, appellee makes no claim that he did not have 
actual notice of the filing of the notice of appeal . Assuming that 
there was technical noncompliance with Rule 33 of this Court for 
the reasons urged by appellee, that noncompliance does not deprive 
this Court of jurisdiction. Cf. Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U. S. 
316 n . 1 (1969); Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S. 415, 418 n . 7 
(1959). 
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served: "An army is not a deliberative body. It is the 
executive arm. Its law is that of obedience. No ques-
tion can be left open as to the right to command in the 
officer, or the duty of obedience in the soldier." More 
recently we noted that "[t]he military constitutes a spe-
cialized community governed by a separate discipline from 
that of the civilian," Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 
94 ( 1953), and that "the rights of men in the armed forces 
must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding 
demands of discipline and duty .... " Burns v. Wilson, 
346 U. S. 137, 140 ( 1953) (plurality opinion). We have 
also recognized that a military officer holds a particular 
position of responsibility and command in the Armed 
Forces: 
"The President's commission . . . recites that 
'reposing special trust and confidence in the patriot-
ism, valor, fidelity and abilities' of the appointee he 
is named to the specified rank during the pleasure of 
the President." Orloff v. Willoughby, supra, at 91. 
Just as military society has been a society apart from 
civilian society, so "[m]ilitary law ... is a jurisprudence 
which exists separate and apart from the law which 
governs in our federal judicial establishment." Burns v. 
Wilson, supra, at 140. And to maintain the disci-
pline essential to perform its mission effectively, the 
military has developed what "may not unfitly be called 
the customary military law" or "general usage of the mili-
tary service." Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat.19, 35 (1827). 
As the opinion in Martin v. M ott demonstrates, the Court 
has approved the enforcement of those military customs 
and usages by courts-martial from the early days of this 
Nation: 
" ... Courts Martial, when duly organized, are bound 
to execute their duties, and regulate their modes 
of proceeding, in the absence of positive enactments. 
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RICHARD SOLORIO, PETITIONER v. 
UNITED~TES 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
MILITARY APPEALS 
[April -, 1987] 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This case presents the question whe~iction of 
a court-martial convened pursuant to the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (U. C. M. J.) to try a member of the armed 
forces d~ds on the "service connection" of the offense 
charged. We ho~ that it does not, and overrule our earlier 
decision in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U. S. 258 (1969). 
While petitioner Richard Solorio was on active duty in the 
Seventeenth Coast Guard District in Juneau, Alaska, he sex-
ually abused two young daughters of fellow Coast Guards-
men. Petitioner engaged in this abuse over a two-year 
period until he was transferred by the Coast Guard to Gover-
nors Island, New York. Coast Guard authorities learned of 
the Alaska crimes only after petitioner's transfer, and inves-
tigation revealed that he had later committed similar sexual 
abuse offenses while stationed in New York. The Governors 
Island commander convened a general court-martial to try 
petitioner for crimes alleged to have occurred in Alaska and 
New York. 
There is no "base" or "post" where Coast Guard personnel 
live and work in Juneau. Consequently, nearly all Coast 
Guard military personnel reside in the civilian community. 
Petitioner's Alaska offenses were committed in his privately 
owned home, and the fathers of the ten-to-twelve-year-old 
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victims in Alaska were active duty members of the Coast 
Guard assigned to the same command as petitioner. Peti-
tioner's New York offenses also involved daughters of fellow 
Coast Guardsmen, but were committed in government quar-
ters on the Governors Island base. 
After the general court-martial was convened in New 
York, petitioner moved to dismiss the charges for crimes 
committed in Alaska on the ground that the court lacked 
jurisdiction under this Court's decisions in O'Callahan v. 
Parker, 395 U. S. 258 (1969), and Relford v. Commandant, 
401 U. S. 355 (1971). 1 Ruling that the Alaska offenses were 
not sufficiently "service connected" to be tried in the military 
criminal justice system, the court-martial judge granted the 
motion to dismiss. The Government appealed the dismissal 
of the charges to the United States Coast Guard Court of 
Military ~view, which reversed t rial jud e's order and 
reinstatedthe charges. United States v. o orw, . J. 512 
(1985).
The United States Court of Military Appeal~ the 
Court of M~cl~ of-
fenses were connec e within the meaning of 
O'Callahan an e ord. mtea States v. Solorio, 21M. J. 
251 (1986). Stating that "not every off-base offense against 
a servicemember's dependent is service-connected," the 
court reasoned that "sex offenses against young children . . . 
have a continuing effect on the victims and their families and 
ultimately on the morale of any military unit or organization 
to which the family member is assigned." I d., at 256. In 
reaching its holding, the court also weighed a number of 
1 Petitioner was charged with fourteen specifications alleging indecent 
liberties, lascivious acts, and indecent assault in violation of Article 134, 
U. C. M. J ., 10 U. S. C. § 934, six specifications alleging assault in viola-
tion of U. C. M. J. Art. 128, 10 U. S. C. § 928, and one specification alleg-
ing attempted rape in violation of U. C. M. J. Art. 80, 10 U. S. C. § 880. 
The specifications alleged to have occurred in Alaska included all of the 
Article 128 and Article 80 specifications and seven of the Article 134 
specifications. 
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other factors, including: the interest of Alaska civilian offi-
cials in prosecuting petitioner; the hardship on the victims, 
who had moved from Alaska, that would result if they were 
called to testify both at a civilian trial in Alaska and at the 
military proceeding in New York; and the benefits to peti-
tioner and the Coast Guard from trying the Alaska and New 
York offenses together. 2 This court subsequently granted 
certiorari, 28 U. S. C. § 1259(3), to review the decision of the 
Court of Military Appeals. We now affirm. 
The Constitution grants to Congress the power "[t]o make 
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and 
naval Forces." U. S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. Exercising 
this authority, Congress has empowered courts-martial to 
try servicemen for the crimes proscribed by the U. C. M. J. 
Art. 2, U. C. M. J., 10 U. S.C. §§802, 817. The Alaska of-
fenses with which petitioner was charged are each described 
in the U. C. M. J. Seen. 1, supra. Thus it is not disputed 
that the court-martial convened in New York possessed the 
statutory authority to try petitioner on the Alaska child 
abuse specifications. 
In an unbroken line of decisions from 1866 to 1960, this 
Court interpreted the Constitution as conditioning the proper 
exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over an offense on one 
factor: the military status of the accused. Gosa v. Mayden, 
413 U. S. 665, 673 (1973) (plurality opinion); see Kinsella v. 
Singleton, 361 U. S. 234, 240-241, 243 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 
354 U. S. 1, 22-23 (1957) (plurality opinion); Grafton v. 
United States, 206 U. S. 333, 348 (1907); Johnson v. Sayre, 
158 U. S. 109, 114 (1895); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167, 
2 Following the decision of the Court of Military Appeals, petitioner un-
successfully sought a stay from that Court and from Chief Justice Burger. 
The court-martial reconvened and petitioner was convicted of eight of the 
fourteen specifications alleging offenses committed in Alaska and four of 
the seven specifications alleging offenses committed in New York. These 
convictions are currently under review by the conv~ning authority pursu-
ant to U. C. M. J., Art. 60, 10 U.S. C. §860. 
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183-185 (1886); Coleman v. Tennessee, 7 Otto 509, 513-514 
(1879); Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 123 (1866); cf. Toth v. 
Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 15 (1955); Kahn v. Anderson, 255 
U. S. 1, 6-9 (1921); Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U. S. 11, 20-21 
(1921). This view was premised on what the Court de-
scribed as the "natural meaning" of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, as well 
as the Fifth Amendment's exception for "cases arising in the 
land or naval forces." Reid v. Covert, supra, at 19; Toth v. 
Quarles, supra, at 15. As explained in Kinsella v. Single-
ton, supra: 
"The test for jurisdiction ... is one of status, namely, 
whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding is a 
person who can be regarded as falling within the term 
'land and naval Forces.' . . . Without contradiction, the 
materials . . . show that military jurisdiction has always 
been based on the 'status' of the accused, rather than on 
the nature of the offense. To say that military jurisdic-
tion 'defies definition in terms of military "status'" is to 
defy the unambiguous language of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, as 
well as the historical background thereof and the prece-
dents with reference thereto." 361 U. S., at 240-241, 
243 (emphasis in original). 
Implicit in the military status test was the principle that 
determinations concerning the scope of court-martial juris-
diction over offenses committed by servicemen was a matter 
reserved for Congress: 
"[T]he rights of men in the armed forces must perforce 
be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of 
discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not agencies 
which must determine the precise balance to be struck in 
this adjustment. The Framers expressly entrusted that 
task to Congress." Burns v. Wilson, 346 137, 140 
(1953) (plurality opinion). 
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See also Coleman v. Tennessee, supra, at 514 (1878); War-
ren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 
181, 187 (1962). 3 
In 1969, the Court i O'Callaha--:;).,, Parker departed from 
the military status te an ~~ced the "new constitu-
tiona~t a military tribunal may not try a ser-
viceman charged with a crime that has no service connection. 
See Gosa v. Mayden, supra, at 673. Applying this principle, 
the O'Callahan Court held that a serviceman's off-base sex-
ual assault on a civilian with no connection with the military \ 
could not be tried by court-martial. On reexamination of 
O'Callahan, we have decided that the service connection test 
announced in that decision should be abandoned. 
The constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate 
the armed forces, Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, appears in the same sec-
tion as do the provisions granting Congress authority, inter 
alia, to regulate commerce among the several states, to coin 
. money, and to declare war. On its face there is no indication 
that the grant of power in clause 14 was any less plenary than 
the grants of other authority to Congress in the same section. 
Whatever doubts there might be about the extent of Con-
gress' power under clause 14 to make rules for the "Govern-
ment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," that 
power surely embraces the authority to regulate the conduct 
of persons who are actually members of the armed services. 
As noted by Justice Harlan in his O'Callahan dissent, there 
is no evidence m tne a ebafes over the adoption of the Con-
3 One pre-1969 decision of this Court suggests that the constitutional 
power of Congress to authorize trial by court-martial must be limited to 
"the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." Toth v. Quarles, 
350 U. S. 11, 23 (1955) (emphasis deleted). Broadly read, this dictum ap-
plies to determinations concerning Congress' authority over the courts-
martial of servicemen for crimes committed while they were servicemen. 
Yet the Court in Toth v. Quarles was addressing only the question whether 
an ex-serviceman may be tried by court-martial for crimes committed 
while serving in the Air Force. Thus, the dictum may be also interpreted 
as limited to that context. 
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stitution that the Framers intended the language of clause 14 
to be accorded anything other than its plain meaning. 4 Al-
exander Hamilton described these powers of Congress "es-
sential to the common defense" as follows: 
"These powers ought to exist without limitation be-
cause it is impossible to foresee or define the extent or 
variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent 
extent and variety of the means which may be necessary 
to satisfy them. 
Are fleets and armies and revenues necessary for this 
purpose [common safety]? The government of the 
Union must be empowered to pass all laws and to make 
regulations which have relation to them." The Federal-
ist No. 23. 
The O'Callahan Court's historical foundation for its hold-
ing rests on the view that "[b]oth in England prior to the 
American Revolution and in our own national history military 
trial of soldiers committing civilian offenses has been viewed 
with suspicion." 395 U. S., at 268. According to the Court, 
the historical evidence demonstrates that, during the late 
17th and 18th centuries in England as well as the early years 
of this country, courts-martial did not have authority to try 
soldiers for civilian offenses. The Court began with a review 
of the 17th century struggle in England between Parliament 
and the Crown over control of the scope of court-martial ju-
risdiction. As stated by the Court, this conflict was resolved 
when William and Mary accepted the Bill of Rights in 1689, 
which granted Parliament exclusive authority to define the 
jurisdiction of military tribunals. See 395 U. S., at 268. 
The Court correctly observed that Parliament, wary of 
' See O'C allahan, 395 U. S., at 277 (Harlan, J ., dissenting); 2 
M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 329-330 
(1911); 5 J. Elliot, Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution in 
the Convention Held in Philadelphia in 1787, 443, 545 (1876). 
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abuses of military power, exercised its new authority 
sparingly. 5 Indeed, a statute enacted by Parliament in 1689 
provided for court-martial only for the crimes of sedition, mu-
tiny, and desertion, and exempted members of militia from 
its scope. Mutiny Act of 1689, 1 W & M, Sess. 2, c. 4. 
The O'Callahan Court's representation of English history 
following the Mih ary ct o , owever, IS ess an accu-
r.ate. In particular, the Court posited that "[i]t was . . . the 
rule in Britain at the time of the American Revolution that a 
soldier could not be tried for a civilian offense committed in 
Britain; instead military officers were required to use their 
energies and office to insure that the accused soldier would 
be tried before a civil court." 395 U. S., at 269. In making 
this statement, the Court was apparently referring to Section 
XI, Article I of the British Articles of War in effect at the 
time of the Revolution. 6 This Article provided: 
"Whenever any Officer or Soldier shall be accused of a 
Capital Crime, or of having used Violence, or committed 
any offence [sic] against the Persons or Property of Our 
Subjects, ... the Commanding Officer and Officers of 
every Regiment, Troop, or Party to which the ... ac-
cused shall belong are hereby required upon application 
duly made by or in behalf of the Party or Parties injured, 
to use . . . utmost Endeavors to deliver over the accused 
5 See, e. g., 1 W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 8-9 (2d ed. / 
1896) (hereinafter Winthrop); G. Nelson & J. Westbrook, Court-Martial 
Jurisdiction Over Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis of 
O'Callahan v. Parker, 54 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 7-11 (1969) (hereinafter Nelson 
& Westbrook). 
6 There is some confusion among historians and legal scholars about 
which version of the British Articles of War were "in effect" at the time 
of the American Revolution. Some cite to the Articles of War of 1765 
and others to the Articles of War of 1774. Compare, e. g., 2 Winthrop 
1448, with J.:.- H~~Court-Martial Jurisdiction 34 (1986) (hereinafter 
Horbaly). Forpreseiif purposes, however, the two versions of the Arti-
cles contain only stylistic differences. In the interest of simplicity, we will 
refer to the 177 4 Articles. 
8 
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. . . to the Civil Magistrate." British Articles of War of 
1774, reprinted in G. Davis, A Treatise on the Military 
Law of the United States 581, 589 (3d ed. 1915) (herein-
after Davis). 
This provision, however, is not the sole statement in the 
Articles bearing on court-martial jurisdiction over civilian 
offenses. Specifically, Section XIV, Article XVI provided 
that all officers and soldiers who 
"shall maliciously destroy any Property whatsoever be-
longing to any of our Subjects, unless by order of the 
then Commander in Chief of Our Forces, to annoy 
Rebels or other Enemies in Arms against Us, that he or 
they shall be found guilty of offending herein shall (be-
sides such Penalties as they are liable to by law) be pun-
ished according to the Nature and Degree of the Offence 
[sic], by the Judgment of a Regimental or General Court 
Martial." Davis 593. 
Under this provision, military tribunals had jurisdiction over 
offenses punishable under civil law. Nelson & Westbrook 
11. Accordingly, the O'Callahan Court erred in suggesting 
that, at the time of the American Revolution, military tribu-
nals in England "were available only where ordinary civil 
courts were not." 395 U. S., at 269, and n. 11. 
The history of early American practice furnishes even less 
support to O'Callahan's historical thesis. The American Ar-
ticles of War of 1776, which were based on the British Arti-
cles, contained a provision similar to Section XI, Article I of 
the British Articles, requiring commanding officers to deliver 
over to civil magistrates any officer or soldier accused of "a 
capital crime, ... having used violence, or ... any offense 
against the persons or property of the good people of the 
United States" upon application by or on behalf of an injured 
party. American Articles of War of 1776, Section IX, Arti-
cle I, reprinted in 2 Winthrop 1490. It has been postulated 
that American courts-martial had jurisdiction over the crimes 
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described in this provision where no application for a civilian 
trial was made by or on behalf of the injured civilian. 7 In-
deed, American military records reflect trials by court-mar-
tial during the late 18th century for offenses against civilians 
and punishable under civil law, such as theft and assault. 8 
The authority to try soldiers for civilian crimes may be j 
found in the much-disputed "general article" of the 1776 Arti-
cles of War, which allowed court-martial jurisdiction over 
"[a]ll crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects which 
officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good 
order and military discipline." American Articles of War of 
1776, Section XVIII, Article 5, reprinted in 2 Winthrop ~503. 
Some authorities, such as those cited by the O'Callahan 
Court, interpreted this language as limiting court-martial ju-
risdiction to crimes that had a direct impact on military disci-
pline. 9 Several others, however, have interpreted the lan-
guage as encompassing all nQncapital crimes proscribed by 
the civillaw.'0 Even W. Winthrop, the authority relied on 
7 See Nelson & Westbrook 14; cf. Duke & Vogel, The Constitution and 
the Standing Army: Another Problem with Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 13 
Vand. L. Rev. 435, 445-446 (1960) (hereinafter Duke & Vogel). 
8 See O'C allahan, 395 U. S. , at 278, n. 3 (Harlan, J ., dissenting); see 
alsoJ. Bishop, Justice under Fire 81-82 (1974) (hereinafter Bishop); Nelson 
& Westbrook 15; Comment, O'Callahan and Its Progeny: A Survey of 
Their Impact on the Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial, 15 Viii. L. Rev. 712, 
719, n. 38 (1970) (hereinafter Comment). 
9 See 2 Winthrop 1123; Duke & Vogel446-447. 
10 See, e. g., Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333, 348 (1907); Hear-
ings before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs , Appendix to S. Rep. 
No. 130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 25, 91 (statement of Brigadier General 
Enoch Crowder). 
George Washington also seems to have held this view. When informed 
of the decision of a military court that a complaint by a civilian against a 
member of the military should be redressed only in a civilian court, he 
stated in a General Order dated February 24, 1779: 
"All the improper treatment of an inhabitant by an officer or soldier being 
destructive of good order and discipline as well as subversive of the rights 
of society is as much a breach of the military, as civil law and as punishable 
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most extensively by the majority in O'Callahan, recognized 
that military authorities read the general article to include 
crimes "committed upon or against civilians . .. at or near a 
military camp or post." 2 Winthrop 1124, 1126, n. 1. 
We think the history of court-martial jurisdiction in Eng-
land and in this country _during the 17th and 18th centuries 
is far too ambiguous to justify the restriction on the plain 
language of clause 14 which O'Callahan imported into it. 11 
There is no doubt that the English practice during this period 
shows a strong desire in that country to transfer from the 
Crown to Parliament the control of the scope of court-martial 
jurisdiction. And it is equally true that Parliament was 
chary in granting jurisdiction to courts-martial, although not 
as chary as the O'Callahan opinion suggests. But reading 
clause 14 consistently with its plain language does not dis-
serve that concern; Congress, and not the Executive, was 
given the authority to make rules for the regulation of the 
armed forces. 
The O'Callahan Court cryptically stated that "the 17th 
century conflict over the proper role of courts-martial and the 
enforcement of the domestic, criminal law was not, however, 
merely a dispute over what organ of government had juris-
by the one as the other." 14 Writings of Washington 140-141 (George 
Washington Bicentennial ed. 1936). 
" The history of court-martial jurisdiction after the adoption of the Con-
stitution also provides little support for O'Callahan. For example, in 
1800, Congress enacted Articles for the Better Government of the Navy, 
which provided that "[a]ll offences [sic] committed by persons belonging to 
the navy while on the shore, shall be punished in the same manner as if 
they had been committed at sea." Act of April23, 1800, ch. 33, art. XVII, 
2 Stat. 47. Among the offenses punishable if committed at sea were mur-
der, embezzlement, and theft. In addition, the Act also provided that "[i]f 
any person in the navy shall, wheJl on shore, plunder, abuse, or maltreat 
any inhabitant, or injure his property in any way, he shall suffer such pun-
ishment as the court martial shall adjudge." Art. XXVII, 2 Stat. 48. 
This broad grant of jurisdiction to naval courts-martial would suggest that 
limitations on the power of other military tribunals d:rring this period were 
the result of legislative choice rather than want of constitutional power. 
' . 
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diction. It also involved substantive disapproval of the gen-
eral use of military courts for trial of ordinary crimes." 395 
U. S. at, 268. But such disapproval in England at the time 
of William and Mary hardly proves that the Framers of the 
Constitution, contrary to the plenary language in which they 
conferred the power on Congress, meant to freeze court-mar-
tial usage at a particular time in such a way that Congress 
might not change it. The unqualified language of clause 14 
suggests that whatever these concerns, they were met by the 
vesting in Congress, rather than the Executive, authority to 
make rules for the government of the military.'2 
Given the dearth of histQrical support for the O'Callahan 
holding, there 1s overw e mmg orce o ustlce Ian's 
reasoning that the p am angua e e on 1 ' as 
interpreted by numerous decisions of this Court preceding 
12 See, e. g., O'Callahan, 395 U.S., at 277 (Harlan, J., dissenting); 1 
W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitutio 4, 424-426 (1953) (here-
inafter Crosskey); Comment 718; but c . Horbaly, Court Martial Jurisdic-
tion 45-56 (1986). 
The only other basis for saying that the Framers intended the words of 
Art. I, § 8. cl. 14 to be narrowly construed is the suggestion that the Fram-
ers "could hardly have been unaware of Blackstone's strong condemnation 
of criminal justice administered under military procedures." Duke & 
Vogel 449. In his Commentaries, Blackstone wrote: 
"When the nation was engaged in war ... more rigorous methods were put 
in use for the raising of armies, and the due regulation and discipline of the 
soldiery; which are to be looked upon only as temporary excrescences bred 
out of the distemper of the state, and not as any part of the permanent and 
perpetual laws of the Kingdom. For martial law, which is built on no set-
tled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in it's [sic] decisions, is ... some-
thing indulged in rather than allowed as a law. The necessity of order and 
discipline in an army is the only thing which can give it countenance; and 
therefore it ought not to be permitted in time of peace, when the King's 
courts are open to all persons to receive justice according to the laws of the 
land." 1 Blackstone, Commentaries *413. 
Although we do not doubt that Blackstone's views on military law were 
known to the Framers, see Crosskey 411-412, 424-425, we are not per-
suaded that their relevance is sufficiently compelling to overcome the 
unqualified language of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
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O'Callahan, should be controlling on the subject of court-
martial jurisdiction. 395 U. S., at 275-278 Harlan, J., dis-
senting); cf. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 
U. S. 658, 696 (1978) ("[W]e ought not 'disregard the implica-
tions of an exercise of judicial authority assumed to be proper 
for [100] years'"), quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 u. s. 294, 307 (1962). } 
Decisions of this Court after O'Callahan have also empha-
sized that Congress has primary responsibility for the deli-
cate task of balancing the rights of servicemen against the 
needs of the military. As we recently reiterated, "'[j]udicial 
deference is at its apogee when legislative action under the 
congressional authority to raise and support armies and make 
rules and regulations for their governance is challenged.'" 
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S. --,-- (1986), quoting 
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57, 70 (1981). Since 
O'Callahan, we have adhered to this principle of deference in 
a variety of contexts where, as here, the constitutional rights 
of servicemen were implicated. See, e. g., Goldman v. 
Weinberger, supra, at-- (free exercise of religion); Chap-
pell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 300-305 (1983) (racial dis-
crimination); Rostker v. Goldberg, supra, at 64-66, 70-71 
(sex discrimination); Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 357, 360 
(1980) (free expression); Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U. S. 25, 
43 (1976) (right to counsel in summary court-martial proceed-
ings); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738, 753 (1975) 
(availab~ of injunctive relief from an impending court-
martial), Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 756 (1974) (due proc-
ess rights and freedom of expression). 
The notion that civil courts are "ill-equipped" to establish ~ 
policies regarding matters of military concern is substanti-
.ated by experience under the service-connection approach. 
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S., at 305. In his O'Callahan 
dissent, Justice Harlan forecasted that "the infinite permuta-~~ 
tions of possibly -relevant factors are bound to create confu-
sion and proliferate litigation over the [court-martial] juris-
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diction issue." 395 U. S., at 284. In fact, within two years 
after O'Callahan, this Court found it necessary to expound 
on the meaning of the decision, enumerating a myriad of fac-
tors for courts to weigh in determining whether an offense is 
service connected. Relford, supra. Yet the service connec-
tion approach, even as elucidated in Relford, has proved con-
fusing and difficult for military courts to apply. 13 
Since O'Callahan and Relford, military courts have identi-
fied numerous categories of offenses requiring specialized 
analysis of the service connection requirement. For exam-
ple, the courts have highlighted subtle distinctions among of-
fenses committed on a military base, offenses committed off-
base, offenses arising from events occurring both on and off a 
base, and offenses committed on or near the boundaries of a 
base. 14 Much time and energy has also been expended in liti-
gation over other jurisdictional factors, such as the status of 
the victim of the crime, and the results are difficult to recon-
cile. 15 The confusion created by the complexity of the service 
18 See Cooper, O'Callahan Revisited: Severing the Service Connection, 
76 Mil. L. Rev. 165, 186-187 (1977) (hereinafter Cooper); Tomes, The 
Imagination of the Prosecutor: The Only Limitation to Off-Post Jurisdic-
tion Now, Fifteen Years After O'Callahan v. Parker, 25 A. F . L. Rev. 1, 
9-35 (1985) (hereinafter Tomes); cf. United States v. Alef, 3M. J . 414, 416, 
n. 4. (C. M. A. 1977); United States v. McCarthy, 2 M. J . 26, 29, n. 1 
(C. M. A. 1976). 
14 See, e. g., United States v. Garries, 19 M. J. 845 (A. F. C. M. R. 
1985) (serviceman's on-post murder of wife held service connected), aff'd , 
22M. J. 288 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U. S. - (1986); United States v. 
Williamson, 19M. J. 617 (A. C. M. R. 1984) (serviceman's off-post sexual 
offense involving young girl held service connected); United States v. 
Mauck, 17M. J. 1033 (A. C. M. R.) (variety of offenses committed fifteen 
feet from arsenal boundary held service connected), petition for review de-
nied, 19 M. J. 106 (C. M. A. 1984); United States v. Scott, 15 M. J. 589 
(A. C. M. R. 1983) (serviceman's off-post murder of another serviceman 
held service connected where crime had its basis in on-post conduct of 
participants). 
16 Compare United States v. Wilson, 2M. J. 24 (C. M. A. 1976) (off-post 
robbery and assault of a fellow servicemen held not service connected), and 
United States v. Tucker, 1M. J. 463 (C. M. A. 1976) (off-post concealment 
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connection requirement, however, is perhaps best illustrated 
in the area of off-base drug offenses. 16 Soon after 
O'Callahan, the Court of Military Appeals held that drug of-
fenses were of such "special military importance" that their 
trial by court-martial was unaffected by the deCision. United 
States v. Beeker, 18 U. S. C. M. A. 563, 565, 40 C. M. R. 
275, 277 (1969). Nevertheless, the court has changed its posi-
tion on the issue no less than two times since Beeker, each 
time basing its decision on O'Callahan and Relford. 17 
of property stolen from fellow serviceman on-post held not to be service 
connected), with United States v. Lockwood, 15 M. J. 1 (C. M. A. 1983) 
(on-post larceny of fellow serviceman's wallet and use of identification 
cards in it to obtain loan from an off-post business establishment held serv-
ice connected), and United States v. Shorte, 18M. J. 518 (A. F. C. M. R. 
1984) (off-post felonious assault committed against fellow serviceman held 
not service connected). 
16 See Cooper 172-182; Tomes 13-31. 
17 Seven years after United States v. Beeker, the Court of Military 
Appeals expressly renounced that decision, holding that O'Callahan and 
Relford mandated the conclusion that off-base drug offenses by a service-
man could not be tried by court-martial. See United States v. McCarthy, 
2 M. J. 26, 29 (C. M. A. 1976); United States v. Williams, 2 M. J. 81, 82 
(C. M. A. 1976); see also United States v. Conn, 6 M. J. 351, 353 (C. M. A. 
1979); United States v. Alef, 3 M. J . 414, 415-418 (C. M. A. 1977). Re-
versing its position again in 1980, the Court of Military Appeals decided 
that such a restrictive approach was not required under this Court's deci-
sions. United States v. Trottier, 9 M. J. 337, 340-351 (1980). The court 
therefore held that "the gravity and immediacy of the threat to military 
personnel and installations posed by drug traffic and ... abuse convince us 
that very few drug involvements of a service person will not be 'service 
connected.'" I d., at 351. 
United States v. Trottier, however, has not settled the confusion in this 
area. In Trottier, the court identified the following exception to its gen-
eral rule: "[I]t would not appear that use of marijuana by a serviceperson 
on a lengthy period of leave away from the military community would have 
such an effect on the military as to warrant the invocation of a claim of spe-
cial military interest and significance adequate to support court-martial ju-
risdiction under O'Callahan." ld., at 350, n. 28. Since Trottier, at least 
two lower military court decisions have found court-martial jurisdiction 
over offenses arguably falling within this exception. See United States v. 
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When considered together with the doubtful foundations of 
O'Callahan, the confusion wrought by the decision leads us 
to conclude that we should read clause 14 in accord with the 
plain meaning of its language as we did in the many years be-
fore. O'Callahan was decided. That case's novel approach to 
court-martial jurisdiction must bow "to the lessons of experi-
ence and the force of better reasoning." Burnet v. Coro-
nado, 285 U. S. 393, 406-408 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). We therefore hold that the requirements of the 
Constitution are not violated where, as here, a court-martial 
is convened to try a serviceman who was a member of the 
armed services at the time of the offense charged. 18 
Affirmed. 
Lange, 11 M. J. 884 (A. F. C. M. R. 1981), petition for review denied, 12 
M. J. 318 (C. M. A. 1981) (off-post use of marijuana during six-day leave 
held sufficient to establish service connection); United States v. Brace, 11 
M. J. 794 (A. F. C. M. R.), petition for review denied, 12 M. J. 109 
(C. M. A. 1981) (off-post use of marijuana during six-day leave 275 miles 
from post held sufficient to establish service connection); see also Horbaly 
534-535. 
18 Petitioner argues that the Court of Military Appeals' decision should be 
reversed because it applies a more expansive subject-matter jurisdiction 
test to him than had previously been announced. According to petitioner, 
the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over him violates his rights under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Our review of the 
record in this case, however, reveals that petitioner did not raise his due 
process claim in the Court of Military Appeals. The Court of Military Re-
view, which reinstated the Alaska charges against petitioner, held that 
military courts had jurisdiction over petitioner's Alaska offenses. Peti-
tioner therefore had an opportunity to raise his due process challenge in 
the proceedings before the Court of Military Appeals. He has not offered 
any explanation for his failure to do so. In fact, petitioner, in his reply 
brief and at oral argument, did not contest the Government's suggestion 
that he inexcusably failed to raise his due process claim earlier in the pro-
ceedings. See Reply Brief of Petitioner 16-19; Tr. of Oral Arg. 36-39. 
We therefore decline to consider the claim. See, e. g., Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 443 (1984); Delta Air Lines v. August, 450 U. S. 
346, 362 (1981); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 788, n. 7 (1977). 
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